Turmoil to Transformation: Leadership Challenges in Victoria’s Fire Services (1990–2025)

Introduction

Victoria’s fire services have experienced decades of leadership turmoil and institutional conflict, spanning from the early 1990s through to 2025. The Country Fire Authority (CFA) – a predominantly volunteer-based rural fire service – and Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV) – a newer career firefighter organisation formed in 2020 – have both been at the center of repeated controversies over leadership stability, governance, and organisational culture. This long-form article examines how historical events and systemic factors have contributed to ongoing leadership instability and dysfunction within both the CFA and FRV.

Key issues include disputes over enterprise bargaining agreements (EBAs), the powerful influence of the United Firefighters Union (UFU), tensions between volunteer and paid firefighters, disruptive governance reforms (such as the creation of FRV), chronic funding and resourcing challenges, internal cultural and morale problems, and long-running structural conflicts — all of which, as highlighted in the VFBV Statement – Explosive Independent Fire Services Monitor Findings, have at times eroded public trust.

We trace the historical evolution of CFA and FRV leadership structures, analyze major contributing factors to instability, and incorporate insights from government inquiries, parliamentary records, media investigations, union and volunteer perspectives, and academic analyses. Where instructive, we also compare these challenges to fire services in other countries (excluding the United States) to draw broader lessons. The article concludes with evidence-based recommendations aimed at strengthening leadership, improving governance, and rebuilding cohesion in Victoria’s fire services.

(Note: Superscript numbers like [1], [2] etc. refer to footnotes with full citations at the end of the article.)

Historical Evolution of Fire Service Leadership (1990–2025)

Early 1990s: Seeds of Conflict in a Changing Fire Service

By the 1990s, the Country Fire Authority had been operating for nearly half a century as one of the world’s largest volunteer-based emergency services. The CFA’s structure – a volunteer force supported by a smaller number of paid staff – was rooted in legislation dating back to 1958, and its culture historically emphasized local volunteer autonomy. However, broader changes in industrial relations and rising service demands began to test this model. In the early 1990s, Australia’s shift to enterprise bargaining in the public sector introduced a new source of friction into the CFA’s leadership environment. For the first time, paid firefighters (represented by the UFU) could negotiate detailed enterprise agreements, which started to encroach on how the CFA managed its operations and volunteers. Even at this early stage, the seeds of conflict were evident: union demands in the 1990s went beyond wages and conditions, seeking to influence CFA work practices in ways that volunteers and managers found concerning[1].

One early flashpoint was the role of Community Support Facilitators (CSFs) – CFA staff who assisted volunteer brigades. During enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) negotiations, the UFU sought to alter or eliminate these roles, a move the CFA resisted on the grounds that it “related to a diminution of the rights and expectations of volunteer members.” The dispute dragged on without resolution, and the UFU imposed extensive work bans — even during the peak of the summer bushfire season in early 2000 — creating a potential risk to community safety. Although a compromise was eventually reached in mid-2000 (with the CSF positions replaced by two new support roles as part of the settlement), this episode foreshadowed a pattern that would recur over the coming decades: protracted industrial disputes in which union pressures clashed with the CFA’s volunteer-oriented ethos, often leading to operational strain and leadership dilemmas[2].

Throughout the 1990s, CFA leadership had to balance modernization with volunteer traditions. The period saw significant challenges such as the Linton bushfire tragedy of 1998, where five CFA volunteers perished, prompting internal reviews into training and safety. Initiatives like a new “minimum skills” training program for all volunteers were launched to professionalize standards. Yet even as the CFA invested in volunteer development and safety culture, tensions with the union simmered in the background. CFA’s 1999–2000 annual report openly acknowledged “continuing dispute over the Enterprise Bargaining Agreement… for the whole year” and described how difficult these negotiations had been for all members. The industrial environment, it noted, was unique given CFA’s “cultural mix of career firefighters and volunteers”[3].

By the end of the 1990s, the leadership of the CFA had managed to avoid complete breakdown during the dispute—thanks largely to last-minute agreements and the extraordinary dedication of both paid and volunteer firefighters who maintained services despite union work bans. These early disputes highlighted (For an under-fire CFA, the problem is patriarchy – Monash Lens) a recurring challenge that continues to confront CFA leadership: how to reconcile the demands of paid staff with the values of volunteers, and how to preserve unity of purpose when industrial relations threaten to divide the organisation.

2000s: Tragedy, Reform and Rising Tensions

The 2000s brought both devastating emergencies and consequential reforms, each influencing leadership dynamics in CFA (and later FRV). In the first decade of the 2000s, the CFA confronted some of the worst bushfires in the nation’s history, including the 2002–03 Alpine fires and the catastrophic Black Saturday bushfires of February 2009. These disasters tested the CFA’s command structure and leadership under extreme conditions. Investigations later identified significant shortcomings in the fire services’ management of those events, particularly Black Saturday which killed 173 people. The subsequent 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) found serious deficiencies in coordination between CFA (which op ([PDF] Inquiry into the CFA Training College at Fiskville)oss country Victoria) and the Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB, which covered metropolitan Melbourne) on that tragic day. One key VBRC recommendation was to establish a high-level Fire Commissioner for Victoria to improve integration between services and advise on demarcation of responsibilities (such as the boundary of the Metropolitan Fire District). This led to the creation of the office of the Fire Serv (VFBV Statement – Explosive Independent Fire Services Monitor Findings) (VFBV Statement – Explosive Independent Fire Services Monitor Findings)a new role intended to provide unified operational leadership across CFA and MFB during major emergencies[4].

In parallel, the CFA’s internal leadership grappled with fallout from Black Saturday. The CFA’s Chief Officer at the time, Russell Rees, faced criticism during the Royal Commission for the agency’s preparedness and situational awareness on 7 February 2009. Although Rees defended the CFA’s efforts, the Commission’s findings precipitated changes: Rees did not renew his contract in mid-2010 amid the scrutiny, and a new Chief Officer, Euan Ferguson, was appointed to lead the CFA’s recovery and refor (CFA board sacked by Victorian Government in bitter dispute over pay and conditions – ABC News)he disaster’s aftermath. Ferguson’s tenure (2010–2015) focused on implementing the Royal Commission’s recommendations and rebuilding community trust. Under his leadership, the CFA improved its incident management systems and invested in better integration with the newly established Fire Services Commissioner’s emergency management framework. Notably, Craig Lapsley became Victoria’s first Fire Services Commissioner, effectively a superior coordinator to whom the CFA and MFB chiefs would report during major incidents. This layering of leadership added a new dimension: while it enhanced inter-agency coordination, it also introduced potential friction as CFA’s chief now shared strategic authority with a Commissioner in Melbourne.

During these years, labor relations issues did not disappear – in fact, they escalated again by the end of the decade. A new CFA-UFU enterprise agreement in 2010 sparked alarm among volunteer representatives. Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV) – the official CFA volunteer association – complained that the 2010 EBA “significantly disadvantages volunteers” and had been reached “without consultation” contrary to a Volunteer Charter that was supposed to guarantee input on matters affecting volunteers. The 2010 agreement, VFBV argued, went beyond normal pay and conditions; it “seeks to regulate CFA operations and management of other staff and volunteers”, effectively allowing the UFU to influence CFA’s management practices across the board. Specific clauses in 2010 were pointed out as problematic: requirements that could control or restrict volunteer training, a clause seemingly preventing volunteers from making submissions on issues that affected them, limitations on deploying paid staff to support volunteer brigades unless moving toward 24-hour staffing (regardless of actual need), and even provisions blocking experienced volunteers from transitioning into paid CFA employment in certain roles. To volunteers, these provisions represented an overreach by the union into the CFA’s volunteer realm – “a major setback for Victoria’s volunteer fire fighting resource” in the words of VFBV’s briefing to Parliament in 2010[5].

The discontent culminating from that EBA led the then-State Government (a Liberal/National Coalition under Premier Ted Baillieu) to commission an independent inquiry into the effect of CFA arrangements on volunteers. Chaired by retired judge David Jones, this 2011 inquiry (known as the Jones Inquiry) validated many volunteer concerns. It called for better consultation, more transparent decision-making in the CFA, and stronger legislative protection of volunteers’ interests[6]. The government formally enshrined a Volunteer Charter in law – an agreement that the CFA must consult with volunteers (through VFBV) on issues impacting them – and vowed that no industrial agreement would override the role of volunteers. The CFA’s leadership in the early 2010s thus had to manage an uneasy truce: on one side, a union pushing for greater say in operations, and on the other, (B051 Annual Report 1999 – 2000)ter and political backing insisting their voice be heard. This balance was delicate.

In practice, CFA management — led by its Chief Officer and CEO — became a de facto mediator between union demands and volunteer expectations, in an effort to maintain effective emergency service delivery.

By the middle of the decade, tensions began to rise once again. In 2014, a change of government in Victoria — with the election of Premier Daniel Andrews — brought a noticeable shift in approach to the ongoing industrial dispute. The United Firefighters Union (UFU), which had previously resisted many of the Coalition’s volunteer-focused policies, now found a more sympathetic ear in the new Labor government (B051 Annual Report 1999 – 2000) .

Euan Ferguson, who had served as CFA Chief Officer during the post–Black Saturday reform period, was unexpectedly removed from his position in 2015 (Fire Rescue Victoria – Wikipedia). Although officially described as a retirement, reports suggest the decision was influenced by elements within the government and the UFU, both of whom sought new leadership as enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) negotiations escalated.

Ferguson was replaced by Steve Warrington (initially in an acting capacity, later confirmed as Chief Officer) ([PDF] CFA Jones Inquiry Implementation Action Plan – VFBV). Around the same time, a new CFA CEO — a former deputy police commissioner — was appointed in late 2015. These leadership changes set the stage for what would become one of the most turbulent chapters in CFA history: the 2015–2016 enterprise bargaining dispute ([PDF] To The Education and Employment Legislation Committee …).

2015–2016: The CFA Crisis and Clean-Out of Leadership

(Sources: Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria – Parliament of Australia [PDF]; “Ex-judge forewarned against veto powers” – Herald Sun)

By 2015, negotiations for a new CFA enterprise agreement for paid firefighters had dragged on for over three years. The United Firefighters Union (UFU) pushed for clauses that CFA management—backed by volunteers and the CFA Board—found unacceptable. Many were seen as extensions of a long-standing push to entrench union control over operational matters, similar to proposals rejected in 2010.

The CFA leadership, including Chief Officer Euan Ferguson (and later Joe Buffone), CEO Lucinda Nolan, and CFA Board Chair John Peberdy, sought legal advice from Victoria’s senior counsel. They were advised that elements of the union’s demands could breach the CFA’s legal obligation to consult with volunteers under the CFA Act. Of particular concern were proposals mandating a minimum of seven paid firefighters at every incident—regardless of whether volunteer crews were present—and limiting the ability of incident controllers to deploy volunteers in integrated (mixed staff) stations. These conditions threatened to undermine the command structure and marginalise the role of volunteers[8].

The dispute escalated publicly in early 2016. Emergency Services Minister Jane Garrett refused to approve the enterprise agreement without significant changes, citing concerns it would compromise volunteer operations. This stance brought her into direct conflict with Premier Daniel Andrews and the UFU, who were determined to push the agreement through. Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV), representing thousands of volunteers, launched a fierce public campaign, staging rallies in Melbourne and mounting widespread media pressure.

In June 2016, the political crisis came to a head. Minister Garrett resigned rather than capitulate to the union-backed deal. In rapid succession, the Andrews Government sacked the entire CFA Board, which had refused to approve the agreement. CEO Lucinda Nolan resigned in protest, followed days later by Chief Officer Joe Buffone, who declared the proposed EBA would leave him unable to fulfil his statutory responsibilities. In his resignation letter, Buffone stated that the agreement compromised his ability to “effectively carry out [his] role”[9].

Within a single week, the CFA’s top leadership—Board, CEO, Chief Officer, and Minister—had been wiped out. The Andrews Government installed an interim board and a new Minister, James Merlino, who quickly endorsed the EBA (with only minor changes). The state’s Emergency Management Commissioner, Craig Lapsley, was tasked with overseeing its implementation and broader reform of Victoria’s fire services.

This was a watershed moment. The unprecedented clean-out of CFA leadership triggered a national debate. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull publicly sided with the volunteers, appearing at a Melbourne rally alongside hundreds of CFA members in protest. He described the EBA push as an “extraordinary assault on volunteerism” and pledged to amend the federal Fair Work Act to protect emergency service volunteers. The resulting Fair Work Amendment (Respect for Emergency Services Volunteers) Act 2016 passed later that year, effectively blocking union agreements from interfering with volunteer rights or operations[10].

The dispute severely impacted morale and trust within the CFA. A government-commissioned review later identified “significant cultural and governance failures” and an “enormous divide between senior management and firefighters”[11]. Volunteers felt betrayed by a government they believed had abandoned them, while many paid firefighters were frustrated by years of industrial gridlock. The sense of unity essential to emergency services had been fractured—career firefighters, volunteers, management, and political leaders found themselves on opposing sides of a bitter conflict.

2017–2020: Fire Services Reform – CFA/FRV Restructuring

In the wake of the 2016 crisis, the Victorian Government moved to fundamentally restructure the state’s fire services in an attempt to solve (or sidestep) the recurrent CFA turmoil. The proposed reform – unveiled in mid-2017 – was to split the CFA’s career firefighters into a new organisation and leave the CFA as an entirely volunteer service. This plan effectively meant merging the CFA’s paid workforce with the Metropolitan Fire Brigade to create a single, statewide professional fire service, later named Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV). FRV would cover metropolitan Melbourne and major regional cities with full-time crews, while CFA volunteers would continue to protect outer-urban and rural areas, as well as support FRV in major incidents. The rationale given was to end the conflict over integrated brigades and union influence in the CFA by structurally separating the volunteers from the paid staff.

However, the path to this reform was contentious. A Victorian Legislative Council Select Committee Inquiry in 2017 (dominated by opposition and crossbench members) scrutinized the government’s fire services reform bill (which also included presumptive cancer compensation for firefighters, adding political complexity). The inquiry received almost 1,900 submissions – many from volunteers opposed to the changes – and held hearings across Victoria[12]. In its final report, the committee recommended the legislation be withdrawn, citing a lack of consultation and warning that the reforms (especially the secondment of staff from FRV back into CFA to support volunteer operations) were deeply flawed[13]. It emerged that the reform package, including the unusual arrangements for staffing CFA brigades via FRV “secondments,” had been devised by a small group within the Department of Premier and Cabinet, largely in secret and without input from CFA or MFB senior leadership. Indeed, the CFA and MFB Chief Officers at the time were reportedly “not even privy to the discussions” that led to the reforms, nor were volunteer representatives – a process that drew sharp criticism as essentially a top-down political fix.

Despite pushback, the Andrews Government pressed on. After prorogation and a state election in 2018 (which the government handily won), the fire services restructuring was passed by the Victorian Parliament in mid-2019. On 1 July 2020, Fire Rescue Victoria was officially established, absorbing the MFB and about 1,400 CFA career firefighters. The CFA was “restored” to a volunteer-only organisation (though still with paid support staff in corporate roles). Then-Premier Andrews framed this as ending a broken system: “We’re getting on with delivering modern fire services… while ensuring CFA volunteers remain at the heart of our firefighting effort”, he said. FRV’s first Commissioner was appointed, and CFA got a new Chief Officer (with Steve Warrington continuing initially, then handing over to others after a brief tenure complicated by further controversy).

The reform was indeed “highly controversial”, as Wikipedia’s entry noted bluntly. Many volunteers resented it, seeing it as effectively handing the union what it wanted: control of all paid firefighters, removed from CFA oversight. Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria lamented that the government had “smashed up” the CFA to pay back the UFU, echoing earlier opposition rhetoric. The UFU and its allies, conversely, welcomed FRV as a way to end what they perceived as decades of under-resourcing and fragmented command for career firefighters.

Structurally, the FRV model brought its own governance challenges. Under the Fire Rescue Victoria Act 1958 (as amended), the FRV Commissioner became the head of a new statutory agency, with broad powers to manage fire and rescue services in its jurisdiction. Crucially, FRV was also mandated to provide support to the CFA “in consultation with and as agreed by” the CFA. This clause reflected a compromise: since CFA volunteers in certain areas would still require support of career staff (for instance, in densely populated areas or day-time coverage), those personnel would be provided by FRV via secondment agreements, rather than being CFA employees. In theory, this preserved volunteer brigade access to professional firefighters while keeping those firefighters under the FRV organisation. In practice, however, it created a convoluted dual reporting structure – seconded FRV officers working in CFA brigades but ultimately beholden to FRV management and UFU industrial agreements.

As FRV commenced, optimism for a “fresh start” was tempered by realism. IBAC, in a later review of the MFB’s legacy issues, noted that although the creation of FRV was an opportunity to reset culture, “since FRV adopted MFB’s policies, procedures and workforce, FRV may have inherited the misconduct risks” identified earlier. In other words, the long-standing industrial and cultural issues did not magically disappear with a new logo. Indeed, just months before FRV’s start, a simmering controversy erupted when CFA Chief Officer Steve Warrington resigned in June 2020 amid allegations he had made disrespectful remarks about female firefighters (allegations he denied). This incident – coming on the cusp of the new era – underscored that cultural problems transcended organisational change.

2020–2025: New Structure, Ongoing Challenges

The period from 2020 to 2025 has been a mix of progress and persistent headaches for leadership in the CFA and FRV. On the positive side, open industrial warfare subsided in the immediate years after the FRV launch. The creation of FRV effectively ended the CFA/UFU EBA dispute by removing CFA as the employer of career firefighters – FRV quickly negotiated its own interim enterprise agreement in 2020, largely reflecting the terms the UFU had sought. Volunteer and union firefighters now operate in officially separate organisations, reducing direct friction in day-to-day activities. The government appointed a Fire Services Implementation Monitor (FSIM), former County Court Judge Gordon Lewis, to oversee the reform rollout and ensure the two new systems (CFA and FRV) worked together. Judge Lewis – interestingly – had been a longtime critic of union veto powers in the fire services; back in 2008 he had warned the government against giving the UFU excessive “consult and agree” control in MFB operations, a warning that went unheeded. Now in a monitoring role, Lewis continued to highlight structural issues. By his fourth and final annual report (covering 2023-24), the Implementation Monitor noted that many of the same problems he identified over a decade earlier still plagued the services, especially regarding the secondment model and union consultation clauses.

One major leadership challenge has been managing the CFA-FRV relationship under the new framework. The CFA, now purely volunteer, still relies heavily on support from paid personnel for training, incident management and administrative roles. According to VFBV, a staggering 94% of CFA’s operational leadership positions (such as brigade captains’ advisors, operations officers, etc.) are filled by staff seconded from FRV. These FRV employees on loan make up virtually the entire CFA chain of command beneath the Chief Officer – in fact, out of roughly 150 uniformed officer positions in CFA’s hierarchy, only 9 (the Deputy Chief Officers) are CFA’s own; the rest are FRV officers assigned to CFA. The CFA Chief Officer “does not even get the chance to choose which” individuals are sent over, as the volunteers point out, leaving CFA with little control over its human resources. When those positions are left unfilled, CFA simply has a gap – and alarmingly, FRV has at times not backfilled vacancies promptly, causing critical support roles in volunteer areas to go empty for extended periods. Such vacancies directly affect brigade support and incident management, straining volunteer leaders. Moreover, VFBV alleges that FRV has retained the budget funds for any seconded positions it fails to fill, effectively “pocketing” the savings and using them to cover its own cost overruns while CFA goes without the personnel. This breeds resentment among volunteers and CFA management alike.

From a governance perspective, this arrangement has been described as fundamentally “unworkable” if not fixed[14]. It ties CFA’s operational effectiveness to FRV’s staffing decisions and financial priorities, an arrangement no other Australian state uses. The Victorian Government insisted in 2020 that such integration was necessary to maintain support for volunteers, but over time it has become clear that it also limits CFA’s autonomy in managing and disciplining those officers, who ultimately answer to an FRV chain of command. The Fire Services Monitor documented numerous instances where the secondment system failed and “constrained CFA’s ability to effectively manage” its affairs. Essentially, CFA’s Chief Officer has responsibility for volunteer brigades without full authority over the staff supposed to help run them – a recipe for blurred accountability.

Culturally, the post-2020 era has seen continued efforts to improve inclusivity and behavior, yet problems remain. One glaring example is the saga of the 2018 VEOHRC (Victorian Equal Opportunity & Human Rights Commission) report into CFA/MFB culture, which contained findings of widespread bullying, sexism and harassment in the fire services. This report was suppressed from public release after the UFU took legal action, arguing it had not been consulted – an injunction the Supreme Court upheld, keeping the report under wraps. Only years later did some details trickle out via media: instances of misogyny (such as senior firefighters engaging in grossly inappropriate behavior towards women) and a “culture of silence” around misconduct were noted. The fact that such a significant investigation’s results were stymied by union litigation demonstrates the ongoing difficulty leadership faces in holding members accountable and being transparent about reform. “Bullying, discrimination and hazing” have been regularly reported within both CFA and MFB/FRV over the years, with whistleblowers claiming that cover-ups and inaction were the default response by those in power. This environment obviously erodes morale for those on the receiving end of abuse and those who expect a professional, respectful workplace. It also presents a challenge for leaders: to change a deeply ingrained culture while parts of the organisation (and union) may resist external scrutiny.

In 2022–2023, an IBAC investigation (Operation Turton) into MFB/FRV shed further light on cultural issues entwined with union influence. IBAC found that between 2014 and 2019, MFB employees (and later FRV employees) repeatedly misused confidential information, often motivated by a desire to advance the interests of the UFU or its long-time secretary, Peter Marshall. MFB staff – some of them UFU members – unlawfully accessed executive emails and leaked sensitive documents directly to the union. This rogue behavior was facilitated by a “problematic workplace culture where employees did not trust management and… always know the Union will back you up”, as IBAC reported, quoting staff who felt management was not acting in their best interests. IBAC concluded that the UFU’s pervasive influence “often hindered the effective administration” of the fire service. It highlighted how “consult and agree” requirements in agreements gave the union a de facto veto over many management decisions, leading to paralysis or abandonment of reforms that management attempted (a phenomenon first officially flagged in Judge Lewis’s 2008 report and echoed again by IBAC in 2022)[15]. In its special report tabled in Parliament in 2024, IBAC recommended tightening information security and reviewing the consultation clauses in the industrial agreements, among other measures, to prevent such misconduct and power-imbalances in the future. The Victorian Government noted that it had updated its public sector industrial relations policies to include a model consultation clause – implicitly aiming to curb the union’s ability to unreasonably delay or veto changes. Time will tell if these changes truly empower agency leaders to lead, or if old habits will persist.

By 2025, leadership in CFA and FRV has somewhat stabilized compared to the chaos of 2016. FRV has a permanent Commissioner (as of 2023, Commissioner Gavin Freeman leads FRV) and CFA a Chief Officer and CEO dedicated to volunteer support. Both services continue to perform admirably on the frontline, responding to large-scale emergencies like the 2019-20 Black Summer bushfires and countless structure fires, accidents and incidents each year. Yet beneath the surface, many issues that undermined leadership in the past linger: a tug-of-war between union and management control, volunteer disillusionment and distrust when they feel sidelined, political point-scoring over the fire services, and a slow pace of cultural change within what have traditionally been very insular, male-dominated organisations.

In summary, the period 1990–2025 has seen the CFA go from a unified (if tension-prone) volunteer/career organisation into a bifurcated system of CFA and FRV. Leadership challenges evolved from simple industrial disputes into full-blown political crises and structural overhaul. Each era – the 90s, 2000s, 2010s, and now 2020s – contributed layers of complexity that current leaders must still navigate. Understanding these historical developments is crucial to addressing the root causes of instability. In the next sections, we delve deeper into the major factors that have recurrently caused leadership turmoil, and examine how each has manifested over the years.

Key Factors Undermining Leadership and Cohesion

Multiple interrelated factors have contributed to leadership instability or dysfunction in the CFA and FRV since 1990. Below we analyze each of the major issues, with detailed references to illustrate their impacts:

Industrial Disputes and Enterprise Bargaining Conflicts

Enterprise bargaining has arguably been the single most disruptive recurring issue for CFA/FRV leadership. Since the introduction of enterprise agreements (EBAs) in the early 1990s, negotiations over paid firefighters’ pay and conditions in Victoria have frequently devolved into conflict, strikes or work bans, and leadership crises. The inherently adversarial nature of these negotiations was compounded by the CFA’s mixed workforce (volunteers and employees) and by clauses extending far beyond typical employment terms into operational control.

The late 1990s EBA dispute was a sign of things to come. As discussed, the 1999–2000 CFA-UFU bargaining round saw protracted deadlock and union industrial action (work bans) that coincided with the summer fire season. Even after settlement, the removal of the CSF volunteer-support roles as part of that deal left bitterness among volunteers. This established a pattern where union victories in bargaining could breed volunteer resentment and distrust in leadership for yielding on issues affecting them.

In 2006–2010, under a state Labor government, another EBA was negotiated that, according to volunteers, further extended the UFU’s reach. The 2010 agreement, ratified just before a state election, triggered the formal protest from VFBV we noted earlier. It’s worth underscoring how unusual that situation was: a volunteer body lobbying Parliament about a union-management industrial deal. VFBV’s 2010 briefing highlighted that the EBA “goes beyond normal union matters such as pay and conditions” and “inextricably impacts… volunteers who have had no say”. This set the stage for the political intervention of the subsequent Coalition government (the Jones Inquiry and legislative Volunteer Charter) aimed at preventing future EBAs from encroaching on volunteer matters.

However, those measures were put to the ultimate test in the 2015–2016 CFA EBA dispute. That episode, detailed in the history section, is a case study in how an industrial dispute can topple an organisation’s entire leadership. The UFU’s contested EBA clauses – e.g. the minimum crew numbers and limitations on volunteer command – were seen by the CFA Board and many others as incompatible with the CFA’s volunteer-based model and possibly illegal under state law. The union, backed by allies in the government, insisted on them regardless. The result was a complete breakdown in the relationship between the UFU and CFA’s leadership. It became “the bitter industrial dispute [that] claimed the entire leadership” of Victoria’s primary bushfire agency. The saga was remarkable: a minister resigning in protest, a chief officer and CEO quitting, and a board sacked – all directly due to an unresolved industrial agreement[8].

In the immediate aftermath, with a new agreement forced through, the government believed shifting paid firefighters to FRV would avoid such showdowns in the future. Indeed, since 2020, EBA negotiations have occurred within FRV (between the UFU and FRV management, under the auspices of the Fair Work Commission) without the added complication of volunteer issues. But even in this new silo, the 2020 FRV Enterprise Agreement’s implementation has had ripple effects. Notably, FRV’s 2020 interim EBA carried over the contentious “consultation and agreement” provisions that require union sign-off on many management decisions (these originated in earlier MFB agreements and were part of the CFA deal). This meant that while the battleground shifted to FRV, the fundamental tension – union prerogative vs management flexibility – remains a live issue. As IBAC noted, those consult-and-agree requirements in the MFB/FRV context have given the union effective veto power, contributing to a culture where employees might bypass or undermine management in favor of union loyalty. The Victorian Government’s recent inclusion of a model consultation clause in public sector agreements aims to strike a better balance (ensuring consultation without paralyzing the organisation)[15]. Implementing such balanced clauses in future FRV agreements will be crucial to preventing a repeat of past disputes that spiraled out of control.

In summary, nearly every EBA cycle for firefighters in Victoria since the 1990s has been fraught:

• 1990s: Extended dispute with work bans, resolved with concessions affecting volunteers[2].
• 2000s: Union pushes into operational territory; volunteers feel marginalized (leading to inquiries/charters).
• 2010s: Explosive dispute culminating in leadership purges and institutional upheaval (trigger for structural reform).
• 2020s: EBA now contained within FRV, but underlying union-management negotiation dynamics continue, requiring careful management.

For fire service leaders, the lesson is clear: industrial negotiations cannot be treated as solely an HR matter – they have existential importance for the organisation’s cohesion. Failure to manage them collaboratively and transparently can cripple leadership authority and public confidence. The challenge ahead will be negotiating future agreements in a way that respects the professional firefighters’ rights and safety (the UFU’s mandate) while not undermining volunteer engagement or operational effectiveness. That likely means all parties – union, management, volunteers, government – coming to the table. Historically, excluding any one of those parties (e.g., volunteers in 2010, or union voices during some political interventions) has led to protracted conflict.

Influence of the United Firefighters Union (UFU)

The United Firefighters Union (Victoria Branch), representing Victoria’s career firefighters, has been a central actor in the story of CFA and FRV leadership challenges. Many issues discussed – industrial disputes, resistance to reforms, cultural clashes – link back to the union’s considerable influence. The UFU’s power stems from several factors: it represents a workforce that is essential to public safety; it has shown a willingness to use aggressive industrial tactics; and it has cultivated strong political connections, especially with Labor governments. Consequently, the UFU has at times wielded influence beyond the normal scope of a public-sector union, inserting itself into operational and management domains and leadership appointments.

Historically, UFU influence grew as career firefighting became more professionalized and unionized from the 1980s onward. The union often clashed with management over issues of staffing and resources – for example, pushing for higher firefighter numbers on trucks, better equipment, and health safeguards (some demands, like decontamination and cancer protections, were undeniably important, highlighted by events such as the Fiskville training facility scandal where firefighters were exposed to toxic chemicals). However, the UFU also consistently pushed to expand the role of paid firefighters at the expense of the volunteer model. As far back as the early 1980s, the UFU lobbied for amalgamating the MFB and CFA and expanding the metropolitan fire district to employ more paid crews, a move resisted by volunteer associations and non-Labor governments. Their agenda has long been one of growth and control: more paid firefighters, and more say for the union in how fire services are run.

One hallmark of UFU influence is the inclusion of detailed work practice and consultation rules in EBAs. These have given the union leverage over decisions like equipment changes, training procedures, and brigade staffing. A telling example: In 2001, when CFA/MFB considered introducing new protective clothing, the UFU invoked an EBA clause requiring union agreement on any new gear, effectively delaying the rollout by years[15]. The aforementioned “consult and agree” clauses have been perhaps the most contentious. According to evidence gathered by IBAC, such clauses meant “the UFU’s influence over day-to-day operation and decision making” could override management initiatives, as “employees would escalate matters to the Union rather than implementing reforms” – indeed, there were occasions when even minor changes (like assessing IT staff capabilities) were stalled because union or its members blocked them. Former MFB Chief Officers testified that this created a de facto union veto on innovations or reforms, a fact formally recognized in multiple inquiries (Judge Lewis in 2008, Fire Services Review 2015, IBAC 2024)[15].

UFU leadership, under long-serving secretary Peter Marshall, also developed a reputation for an uncompromising, confrontational style. There have been multiple allegations – reported in the media and examined in tribunals – of UFU officials bullying or intimidating fire service management to get their way[16]. For instance, in 2015, MFB’s Chief Fire Officer at the time, Peter Rau, resigned and later told a parliamentary inquiry he felt undermined and surveilled by individuals aligned with the union, suggesting he was effectively driven out for not toeing the UFU line. The union has consistently denied improper conduct, often counter-accusing management of incompetence or corrupt behavior. In UFU’s public response to IBAC’s Operation Turton report, for example, the union lambasted IBAC for an “anti-UFU narrative” and defended any member who shared information as whistleblowers against allegedly unethical management. The UFU claimed IBAC ignored purported misconduct by MFB execs (like contract self-extensions) and painted the union’s actions as alerting government to issues. This highlights the adversarial lens through which the UFU often views oversight bodies and management – a posture of perpetual suspicion that management is out to erode firefighter conditions, justifying a very aggressive defense.

Politically, the UFU’s influence peaked during periods of sympathetic government. The 2014 election of the Andrews Labor government saw the UFU almost immediately gain clout – evidenced by the quick removal of CFA’s chief (Ferguson) who was not in favor with the union, and later by the government’s willingness to override the CFA leadership in 2016 to deliver the union-desired EBA. The Opposition Leader in 2016, Matthew Guy, explicitly accused Premier Andrews of “paying back the firefighters’ union” for its support by “smashing up the CFA” and bullying his own minister to resign. While a partisan statement, it captured a widespread perception that UFU had the Premier’s ear. Indeed, leaked correspondence during that time showed UFU Secretary Marshall communicating directly with top government staff about his dissatisfaction with certain CFA leaders, shortly before those leaders were removed.

The UFU’s capacity to mobilize firefighters politically (for example, instructing members to campaign in elections or appear en masse at rallies) also ensured governments took it seriously. In the 2016 federal campaign, the union ran its own ads countering the volunteers’ narrative, and UFU members (career firefighters) pointedly did not publicly oppose the EBA – though some later privately expressed discomfort at the turmoil. The union’s narrative has been that it fights for safety and resources – e.g., citing incidents like the deadly 2014 Hazelwood mine fire or the Fiskville toxin exposures as evidence that stronger union oversight and more paid staff are needed. Critics argue the union uses safety as a pretext to extend control (since no firefighter would argue against safety improvements). There may be truth on both sides: the union has achieved genuine improvements (like better cancer protections and equipment) but also sought advantages (like commanding authority and job reservations) beyond what most industries would consider reasonable in a labor agreement.

For CFA and FRV leadership, UFU influence is a double-edged sword. On one hand, any leader must work with the union to ensure a content, motivated workforce and to benefit from firefighters’ ground-level insights. On the other hand, leaders have to maintain the managerial authority to run the organisation in the public interest, which means sometimes saying “no” to the union. Many CFA/MFB chiefs who did so found themselves facing personal attacks, no-confidence motions from UFU members, or political pressure. Conversely, chiefs perceived as too accommodating might lose the confidence of volunteers or independent board members, as happened in some instances. It’s a delicate balancing act.

The creation of FRV has given the UFU essentially one unified counterpart (FRV management) rather than two (CFA and MFB) to deal with. In theory that could simplify bargaining. But it also means if FRV management were to reach an impasse with the union, it could potentially threaten urban firefighting across the whole state (since UFU could mobilize or strike within FRV’s 3600-strong force, no longer geographically limited to Melbourne). Recognizing this, FRV’s leadership and the union have strong incentives to maintain a workable relationship. So far, outright conflict has been avoided under the new structure, but friction points (like IBAC’s findings on past misconduct, or FRV’s obligation to share power with CFA) still test the relationship.

In conclusion, the UFU’s influence has been a defining factor in Victoria’s fire service governance. Empowered by industrial law and political leverage, the union has shaped many outcomes: some positive for firefighters’ welfare, others problematic for organisational integrity. Any future reform to improve CFA/FRV leadership stability must reckon with the role of the union – finding ways to include firefighters’ voices and legitimate needs without allowing any one stakeholder undue power to paralyze or dominate the service. As IBAC’s Commissioner succinctly put it, “while union representation is a fundamental right of employees,” the UFU’s extensive day-to-day influence “presented challenges and often hindered the effective administration” of the fire services. Achieving the right balance of union input and management control remains critical.

Volunteer vs Paid Firefighter Tensions

A unique feature of Victoria’s fire services (shared with some other regions in Australia) is the combination of a large volunteer cohort working alongside or under the same umbrella as paid professional firefighters. This mix has been a source of strength – enabling surge capacity in disasters and strong community embeddedness – but also a source of persistent tension. Divergent motivations, cultures, and even rival representative bodies (the UFU for paid staff vs. VFBV for CFA volunteers, and more recently the breakaway Victorian Volunteer Firefighters Association (VVFA) for individual volunteers) have sometimes led to an “us vs them” mentality that challenges unified leadership.

From the CFA’s inception in 1945, volunteers were the backbone of the service, with career firefighters only stationed in regional cities and growth corridors. Volunteers bring a spirit of community service, essentially working on their own time and risking their lives to protect others without financial reward. Paid firefighters, by contrast, bring the benefit of full-time availability, high-level training, and often specialist skills, but also operate under a more hierarchical, unionized structure akin to other professional emergency services. When both groups are part of one organisation (as they were in the CFA for decades), disputes can arise over roles, recognition, and resource allocation.

One chronic point of friction has been operational authority on the fireground. Volunteers naturally expect to hold leadership positions in their brigades and at incidents in their local area, especially given their experience and community knowledge. But when integrated brigades (with both paid and volunteer members) became more common in growing suburbs, controversies emerged over whether a paid officer should automatically take charge over a volunteer captain. Many volunteers bristled at the notion that a younger career firefighter from FRV should command an incident in the volunteer’s town if the volunteer captain is equally or more experienced. The 2016 EBA clause attempting to bar volunteers from issuing orders and mandating 7 paid firefighters before an incident could be “made safe” was interpreted by volunteers as effectively sidelining them. This triggered enormous outrage; volunteers felt their competence and authority were being summarily overwritten by union rules. The rallying cry “Hands off CFA” encapsulated volunteer sentiment that their organisation (and by extension, their role) was being taken over by paid staff and union influence[9].

Another tension is access to training and pathways. Volunteers sometimes perceive that desirable training opportunities or modern equipment flow first to career staff. Conversely, career firefighters may worry that volunteers do not (and by virtue of time constraints, cannot) maintain the same skill currency for high-risk tasks, potentially compromising safety. The CFA has long wrestled with providing consistent, quality training to 50,000+ volunteers statewide. The 2011 Jones Inquiry specifically recommended more accessible training for volunteers and genuine inclusion of volunteers in decision-making[6]. Some progress was made – e.g., the CFA implemented minimum skills requirements for all new volunteers in the 2000s, and increased training courses – but large gaps remained. When career staff are co-located at volunteer stations, conflict sometimes arose over training nights and facility use. One of the 2010 EBA complaints from VFBV was that it “controlled and restricted volunteer training arrangements” by giving the UFU a say in how and when volunteers could train with paid instructors.

Then there’s the issue of career progression and recruitment. Many CFA volunteers historically aspired to join the ranks of career firefighters. They had already demonstrated commitment and skill as volunteers, so it was natural to apply those to a paid career. However, UFU influence led to clauses that limited volunteers from seamlessly moving into paid roles – partly out of a union desire to ensure open, competitive recruitment and perhaps to discourage the perception that being a volunteer was a pipeline to a paid job (which might encourage people to volunteer for the “wrong” reasons). This became a sore point; volunteers felt unfairly barred from jobs they were qualified for, while the union worried about favoritism or dilution of standards. A fair middle ground has been hard to find, and leadership often got caught between an angry union (if too many volunteers were hired) and angry volunteers (if they were excluded from consideration). The 2010 EBA’s specific clause “blocking experienced volunteers… from entering paid employment with CFA” was highlighted by volunteers as emblematic of union overreach.

The formation of Fire Rescue Victoria took volunteer vs paid separation to a structural level. It in effect said: “Volunteers, you run CFA; paid firefighters, you form FRV.” In theory, this should reduce day-to-day interpersonal tensions because they largely operate in different jurisdictions. Volunteers regained full control of CFA brigade leadership (since no paid CFA firefighters remain to hold rank over volunteers). And career staff all answer to FRV’s hierarchy without volunteer input. However, this also created new points of contention: volunteers worry about being left out of big decisions or starved of resources, and some feel having a separate service for paid staff will diminish volunteers’ profile and support over time. The secondment system, as discussed, means volunteers still interact with paid officers (though now badged FRV) in training and support roles. If those FRV officers come with what volunteers perceive as a “union agenda” or lack of respect for volunteer capabilities, friction continues. A 2022 survey by VFBV found a significant proportion of volunteers still felt undervalued and concerned that the CFA was being “hollowed out” in expertise due to the arrangement of borrowing staff from FRV (especially when those staff vacancies weren’t promptly filled, leaving volunteers with less support).

Volunteers also have a voice through their associations. Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV) is the officially recognized body under the CFA Act to represent volunteers, and it participated in consultations like the Volunteer Charter. However, during the height of the EBA fight, some individual volunteers felt VFBV was not forceful enough or was structurally constrained (VFBV leaders were seen by some as too close to CFA management). This led to the creation of a breakaway group, the Victorian Volunteer Firefighters Association (VVFA) in late 2016. The VVFA explicitly aimed to represent individual volunteers (not just brigades) and took a more activist stance in defense of volunteer rights. The emergence of VVFA indicated a fracturing in volunteer ranks – itself a symptom of stress – and presented a new challenge for leadership: multiple volunteer groups with sometimes differing approaches. The government largely continued to engage with VFBV as the formal partner, but VVFA’s existence signaled that a segment of volunteers had lost faith in both CFA leadership and VFBV’s advocacy, feeling the need for a more militant voice akin to the union’s.

From the perspective of public trust, the volunteer vs paid saga influenced community perceptions as well. Many Victorians, especially in rural areas, hold their local volunteer brigade in very high esteem. When they saw news of that brigade potentially being “taken over” or diminished by external forces (e.g., the union or a Melbourne-controlled FRV), it caused public outcry. Conversely, in metropolitan communities, citizens just expect a reliable fire service and may not distinguish who is volunteer or paid – but they could be alarmed if internal rifts were seen to jeopardize service delivery.

For leadership, bridging the volunteer-paid divide is paramount. Some steps that have been identified by inquiries and leaders themselves include: improved communication – ensuring volunteers are kept informed and have input in changes (to avoid feelings of alienation), joint training and team-building – to foster mutual respect between volunteers and career staff (when they exercise and learn together, stereotypes break down), clear role definition – so each knows what to expect of the other on the fireground, and recognition and support – making volunteers feel as valued as paid staff (through things like adequate equipment, training, and awards).

Unfortunately, missteps in policy (like the 2016 EBA clauses) did the opposite, entrenching the divide. Undoing that damage will take time and genuine effort. There are positive examples too: countless incidents where volunteers and career firefighters have worked side by side effectively, saving lives and property together with mutual respect. These day-to-day successes rarely make headlines, but they are the norm. It is usually the high-level policy or structural conflicts that poison the well. Thus, it falls to leadership (agency executives and government) to create a structure where both volunteer and paid members see a future and feel heard. The recommendation section will address some approaches to heal this rift.

Governance and Structural Changes

Governance arrangements – how the services are structured and overseen – have had a major impact on leadership stability. We have touched on the biggest structural change, the 2020 creation of FRV and reconstitution of CFA, but several other governance shifts over 1990–2025 also played roles: changes in oversight bodies, leadership appointment processes, and legislative mandates.

In the 1990s, the CFA operated under a relatively static governance: a Board (with government-appointed members, including volunteer representatives), reporting to the Minister for Emergency Services. The CFA’s Act enshrined the importance of volunteers and even at one point was amended to recognize the Volunteer Charter (after 2011). The Board hires the Chief Officer and CEO. One could argue that in the 1990s and early 2000s, this governance model functioned adequately; there were few instances of government intervention in the CFA’s board or management. Leaders like long-time CFA Chief Officer Brian Potter (in the 1980s/90s) or CEO Neil Bibby provided continuity. However, one structural weakness was the dual role of the CFA – trying to manage metropolitan-type operations (with paid staff in urban centers) and volunteer operations in rural areas under one roof. This created inherent tension (as discussed in volunteer vs paid section).

The 2009 Bushfires Royal Commission prompted a governance innovation: the appointment of a Fire Services Commissioner (later evolved into the Emergency Management Commissioner role). This was intended as a coordination mechanism, not a command one per se, but it did insert a new layer of leadership above CFA and MFB chiefs during major emergencies. In practice, Commissioners like Craig Lapsley became quite influential in sector-wide strategy, training, and interoperability improvements. The Commissioner role arguably helped present a united front in certain areas (like statewide fire planning and public warnings) but also risked blurring lines of accountability. For example, during the 2016 dispute, Commissioner Lapsley was tasked to oversee aspects of the EBA implementation – a somewhat awkward role that put him between CFA’s internal issues and government expectations. The Emergency Management Act 2013 further formalized structures like Emergency Management Victoria (EMV), aiming to integrate emergency services at a higher level. This broad governance trend was toward centralization and “all agencies, one system” thinking. Yet, at the same time, the specific conflict within the fire services led to decentralization in 2020 (splitting CFA/FRV). This shows how governance reforms were sometimes pulling in different directions.

The biggest structural change – the FRV formation and CFA restructuring – we’ve covered in detail. It was effectively a governance reset. Instead of one CFA Board managing both volunteer and career, we now have two organisations: CFA with its Board, and FRV with a Commissioner who functions akin to a CEO (with FRV falling under a Department instead of having its own board, since FRV is a successor to the MFB which was historically a state government agency). Initially, to oversee the transition, the government appointed a Fire Services Implementation Monitor (FSIM) (Judge Gordon Lewis). The FSIM’s reports have been brutally honest about governance flaws in the new system. For example, year after year he pointed out that the secondment arrangements were not working well and recommended changes. By 2023, he noted the arrangements were “unprecedented, and no other state or territory has ever transferred control of an emergency service to a third party”, warning that it was resulting in “deterioration and paralysis of decision making” – echoing problems he first highlighted in 2008. That is a damning assessment of the governance model created by the 2020 reforms.

Another governance aspect is leadership appointment and tenure. Stability at the top has been rare. The CFA had a revolving door of Chief Officers and CEOs especially in the 2010s: e.g., CO Russell Rees (resigned 2010 post-Black Saturday), CO Euan Ferguson (2010–2015, contract terminated early), CO Steve Warrington (2016–2020, resigned), CO Jason Heffernan (appointed 2021…). Similarly, CEOs: Mick Bourke (2009–2015), Lucinda Nolan (2015–2016), Frances Diver (2016–2019), then no direct CFA CEO after 2020 (the CFA Chief Officer now also fulfills many duties). MFB and then FRV saw turnover: multiple chief officers in the 2010s (Shane Wright, Nick Dowling, Jim Higgins as acting, then Dan Stephens from UK in 2019 who left in 2020, then Ken Block from Canada as interim FRV Commissioner, then Ken Block’s departure in 2022, etc., now Gavin Freeman in 2023). Such churn often resulted from governance or relational breakdowns, not simply normal retirements. The governance question is: were these leaders given clear mandates and support? Or were the structures setting them up to fail by being caught in crossfire between union, volunteers, and politics? Many would argue the latter in cases like Ferguson or Nolan.

Good governance would buffer operational leadership from political swings and vested interests. Yet, we saw in 2016 the government directly sack the CFA Board when it resisted direction. That was technically within the government’s legal power (the CFA Act allows the minister to remove the Board), but it undermined the notion of an independent statutory authority. After that, some governance changes were floated, like converting CFA into a purely volunteer-based entity with its own volunteer majority board (which has somewhat happened now), and making FRV more directly accountable to government through the Commissioner. Still, lines of accountability can be unclear, especially when both agencies must cooperate in the field.

One more governance challenge has been coordination mechanisms between CFA and FRV. With two agencies, one must ask: who ensures they don’t duplicate efforts or leave gaps? The legislation provides for cooperation, and there are joint committees and agreements (for example, FRV and CFA have a “Service Delivery Partnership Plan” outlining how they work together at co-located stations, etc.). The Emergency Management Commissioner and EMV also play roles in multi-agency planning. But any cracks in these arrangements ultimately test leadership. A case in point: large campaign fires still require unified command – these are managed under state control arrangements where CFA and FRV officers integrate. If personal or institutional rivalries creep in, it could hamper unified command. So far, there have not been any public disasters attributable to CFA/FRV dysfunction (the system managed through 2019-20 fires), but vigilance is needed.

To sum up, governance and structural changes have been both responses to crises and sources of new difficulties:

• The 2009 VBRC-driven changes (Fire Services Commissioner, later EMV) improved some strategic oversight but added hierarchy.
• The 2017-2020 fire services reform fundamentally altered organisational structure with the aim of ending volunteer/paid conflict, but created a complex CFA–FRV dependency that is still being worked out.
• Government actions like board sackings or fast-tracked legislation sometimes solved an immediate issue at the expense of long-term stability.
• Ongoing oversight (like the FSIM) has been invaluable in pointing out governance shortcomings, but implementing those recommendations is up to the government of the day.

Any future adjustments might consider whether CFA should have more direct control of its support staff (even if that means hiring its own paid officers again) and how to formalize collaborative governance between CFA and FRV (perhaps a joint council or interoperability commissioner) so that the two services plan together rather than in silos. Additionally, insulating operational leadership from abrupt political interference – perhaps through fixed tenure appointments ratified by a bipartisan process – could be beneficial.

Budget Constraints and Resourcing Challenges

Resource constraints form a quieter but important backdrop to leadership woes. Ensuring adequate funding, staffing, and equipment for both CFA and FRV has been an ongoing struggle, and shortfalls can exacerbate tensions and weaken leaders’ ability to satisfy their members’ needs.

Historically, CFA’s funding came from a mixture of insurance levy (until 2013), state government contributions, and local brigade fundraising. Brigades often hold tremendous pride in fundraising for additional appliances or station upgrades. However, reliance on volunteers raising money for essential gear can signal under-resourcing. A lack of funding for modern equipment or trucks not only impacts service delivery but also morale – volunteers might feel taken for granted if they must constantly fundraise for basics, and paid staff might feel the government doesn’t value the service if stations and appliances age beyond their use-by date.

There have been times when budget issues sparked controversy: for example, around 2012–2013, debates about replacing the insurance-based Fire Services Levy with a property levy in Victoria raised questions of whether overall fire service funding would increase or just be redistributed. In theory, the 2014 switch to a property-based Fire Services Levy provided a more stable and equitable funding stream for CFA and MFB (now FRV), and the government has touted increased spending on firefighting capability since. Yet demands have also increased – more extreme fire seasons, population growth meaning more areas needing permanent fire coverage, and expensive new technologies (e.g., advanced breathing apparatus, communications systems).

Staffing is a huge part of resourcing. For FRV (and formerly MFB and CFA’s career side), one perpetual union grievance has been not enough firefighters to meet safe staffing levels. The union’s push for 7 on the fireground clause, albeit seen as power grab by some, was rooted in their safety campaign for “2-in/2-out” structure fire rules and adequate backup. In the volunteer context, surge capacity (having enough volunteers available during major incidents) is the parallel issue – concerns about declining volunteer numbers or availability due to modern socioeconomic factors. Leadership must advocate for budgets that allow recruitment and retention initiatives for volunteers, and sufficient career firefighter recruitment to meet coverage needs. When budgets are tight, training programs, station maintenance, and appliance replacement can be delayed – all of which degrade effectiveness over time.

The CFA has periodically been accused of being underfunded in comparison to its metropolitan counterpart. Volunteers have pointed to instances such as outdated tankers remaining in service or fire stations in disrepair in country areas while money flows to new facilities in the city. This perception of unequal resourcing can fuel volunteer resentment towards “the hierarchy” or government. Conversely, urban firefighters sometimes argue that political favoritism to volunteer regions (for electoral reasons) leads to inefficient placement of resources (for instance, retaining an under-used volunteer truck in a town that might be better served by a closer full-time crew).

Major incidents often expose resource gaps starkly. After Black Saturday 2009, the Royal Commission found that emergency call-taking and dispatch systems were overwhelmed – leading to investments in upgrades. The Hazelwood mine fire 2014 found that equipment for such a long-duration, polluting fire was lacking (e.g., respiratory protective equipment and health monitoring for firefighters had shortfalls). The Fiskville Inquiry in 2016 revealed the CFA had not allocated funds to properly clean up a contaminated training site for years, endangering trainees. All these reflect leadership challenges in arguing for and prioritizing funding to mitigate risks.

The period after 2020 saw FRV having to integrate two legacy budgets (MFB and the CFA’s career budget) and rationalize them. There have been reports of FRV facing cost overruns – indeed VFBV claims FRV ran over budget and then failed to fill CFA seconded positions to save money. FRV’s establishment costs (new uniforms, rebranding, harmonizing pay scales between former MFB and CFA staff) were significant. If FRV requires budget supplementation, that’s an issue for government, but if not met, it could lead FRV management to make cuts or hold back on assisting CFA. CFO reports and parliamentary committee hearings would provide insight into whether FRV is adequately funded for its expanded remit.

Volunteer numbers and funding for volunteer initiatives are also vital. Over 1990–2025, lifestyle changes, employer pressures, and an aging rural population have led to concerns about sustaining volunteer levels. The CFA has around 54,000 volunteers on paper, but only a subset are active firefighters. If volunteer ranks dwindle, it can create pressure to expand career staff to cover gaps, again feeding the cycle of tension. Leadership has to champion volunteer recruitment and retention funding (for training, uniforms, incident coverage compensation, etc.). The state has in some years provided grants for brigade equipment and volunteer support (for example, the Volunteer Emergency Services Equipment Program, VESEP). These need to be maintained and grown to keep volunteers engaged and equipped.

In essence, robust leadership requires resources to back up plans. A Chief Officer might have a vision to improve capability, but without funding for trucks, stations, and people, that vision falters. A recurring criticism in inquiries has been that plans are made but not funded robustly. For example, the Jones Inquiry recommended more administrative support to brigades so volunteers aren’t bogged down in paperwork – fulfilling this means hiring support staff or developing IT systems, which costs money. If budgets don’t allow it, the burden remains on volunteers, contributing to burnout.

From a governance view, one of the advantages of the property levy introduced in 2014 was transparency – the government must declare how much it collects for fire services and presumably allocate it accordingly. Ensuring that CFA and FRV both get appropriate shares to fulfill their distinct missions is key. The government generally increases the fire service budget annually, but unexpected costs (like overtime in a bad fire season) can blow out budgets. It then becomes a political issue, e.g., opposition might accuse government of underfunding if trucks break down or if response times increase.

In conclusion, while not as headline-grabbing as union fights, budget and resourcing issues are the soil in which many of the other problems take root. A well-resourced organisation is less prone to internal conflict because there are enough “pies” for everyone to get a slice (training, equipment, opportunities). A poorly resourced one leads to infighting over scraps and greater tension between volunteers and staff or between union and management. Sustainable funding models, multi-year capital plans, and equitable distribution of resources between metro and regional areas are all part of the solution to easing leadership pressure.

Internal Culture and Morale

Organisational culture – the values, behaviors, and norms within CFA and FRV – has a profound effect on leadership. A positive, inclusive culture can energize personnel and support leaders’ goals, whereas a toxic culture can sabotage initiatives and drive good people away. Unfortunately, Victoria’s fire services have faced persistent cultural and morale-related issues, ranging from bullying and discrimination to entrenched distrust between ranks, all of which have undermined leadership authority and the well-being of members.

One longstanding aspect of fire service culture is its para-military structure and masculinity. Firefighting in Australia (as in many countries) has traditionally been male-dominated and steeped in a “tough guy” ethos. While camaraderie and bravery are strengths of that culture, it has also meant slow progress on gender diversity and instances of sexist behavior. The VEOHRC report (2018), which examined CFA and MFB, found not just isolated incidents but systemic issues of “everyday sexism and misogyny” that had been ignored or swept under the rug. For example, female firefighters recounted being harassed or not taken seriously, and even being expected to tolerate crude pranks or commentary as just part of the environment. Leadership faces a dilemma in such a culture: pushing reforms on diversity or discipline can trigger backlash from those resistant to change (sometimes backed by the union if they view investigations as attacks on members). But failure to address it demoralizes and harms the victims and tarnishes the organisation’s reputation. The UFU’s move to legally block publication of the VEOHRC report highlights how hard it can be for leaders to even acknowledge the problems, let alone solve them. When a union resists an independent inquiry’s findings, it sends a signal to members that “outsiders” are not to be trusted – a sentiment that can hamstring a leader’s attempts to be transparent and implement recommendations.

Bullying and intimidation in general have been reported at various levels. Sometimes it’s peer-to-peer (station-level bullying of new recruits or volunteers by old hands, hazing rituals, etc.), other times it’s institutional (intense union campaigns against specific managers, or managers heavy-handing subordinates). The Monash University analysis noted a “boys’ club culture” that works to “deny, denounce, repress and suppress” issues like harassment. Such a culture can close ranks against leadership efforts to change it – e.g., if a chief tries to discipline a popular fire officer for misconduct, he may find half the station and the union up in arms shielding the offender, viewing it as an attack on the brotherhood rather than a justified action. This was illustrated when attempts to investigate allegations in MFB often saw information leaked to the union and interference in the process, as IBAC’s Turton report found. A telling quote IBAC included from firefighters was “no matter what you do, you always know the Union will back you up”, indicating a mindset where formal management processes were undermined by parallel loyalty to the union above the organisation. That obviously makes it hard for leaders to enforce standards – some employees felt essentially invincible (as long as they didn’t cross the union). Changing that narrative is crucial for future leaders to actually lead.

Morale across CFA and FRV has waxed and waned with these conflicts. After events like the 2016 showdown, morale in CFA was reportedly very low – volunteers felt disrespected by government, and staff were traumatized by the turmoil and leadership vacuum. Conversely, volunteers’ morale got a boost when the federal government and public rallied to their side in 2016 – but relying on external validation is not a sustainable situation. Leaders have attempted various morale-boosting initiatives: increased awards and recognition ceremonies, mental health programs (especially after critical incidents), and inclusion efforts such as the formation of women’s firefighter networks. FRV, for instance, inherited the MFB’s Women’s Advisory Committee and has continued to work on improving gender diversity in recruitment.

CFA’s volunteer culture also faces modern challenges – historically it was a proud, can-do culture with generational family involvement. Today, many volunteers struggle to balance huge training demands and call-outs with full-time jobs and family, leading to burnout. If volunteers feel undervalued or overburdened, they leave, which hurts morale of those remaining. A cultural issue specific to volunteers is a possible “us vs them” attitude not just to paid staff, but to CFA headquarters. Some volunteers have viewed CFA HQ with skepticism, as bureaucrats in “Ivory towers” who don’t understand life on the ground. This manifested in reactions to, say, new training requirements (“why do we need city-slicker imposed certificates when we’ve fought fires for 20 years?”) or frustrations with slow delivery of new gear. Effective volunteer leadership within CFA involves keeping those lines of communication open and showing empathy for brigade-level concerns. When leadership failed to consult (as with the 2010 EBA, by their own admission), it fed a narrative that CFA top brass cared more about appeasing the union than their own volunteers.

It’s worth mentioning that not all is negative: both CFA and FRV members often express strong pride and dedication. Morale on the fireground – when crews are actively combating a blaze together – is typically high, because everyone is unified by purpose. Problems tend to fester in the in-between times: station politics, union meetings, budget frustrations, etc. Leaders must harness the positive energy of shared mission and diminish the internecine quarrels.

In terms of formal efforts to address culture: aside from the VEOHRC review (which got stymied), FRV has implemented a “Respect and Inclusion” program, and CFA has similar initiatives for volunteers. The question will be whether these can penetrate to every depot and brigade. Often it requires middle management (station officers, brigade captains) to buy in and model good behavior.

In conclusion, internal culture and morale issues have acted like an undercurrent, sometimes a riptide, pulling leadership off course despite whatever strategic direction they set. You can have the best organisational chart or newest trucks, but if bullying, distrust, and poor morale reign, leadership will flounder. Conversely, a healthy culture can carry an organisation through tough times even if resources are tight. Thus, tackling cultural reform is as important as any structural change. It is slow, sensitive work – hearts and minds stuff – which might not show results immediately, but over the long run it underpins everything else.

Political Interference and Public Trust Erosion

Fire services, by virtue of their high public profile and critical role in safety, inevitably attract political attention. In Victoria, the CFA especially holds a revered status in rural communities, making it a politically sensitive entity. Political interference refers to instances where government (or opposition) actions in the fire services are driven by political motives or pressures rather than purely by what’s best for emergency management. Over 1990–2025, there have been multiple instances of such interference, which have sometimes solved short-term problems but often at the cost of long-term trust and stability.

One could argue that every major step in our narrative had a political dimension:

• The sacking of the CFA Board in 2016 was a direct government interference in an independent statutory authority for reasons widely seen as political (placating the union to avoid an ongoing public dispute in an election year, and resolving an embarrassment for the Premier)[8]. This act fundamentally shook confidence among volunteers that the CFA would be allowed to act in their interest if it conflicted with the ruling party’s interest. It also signaled to career staff that the union had greater sway with the government than the CFA leadership did, perhaps emboldening union expectations even further.
• The federal intervention in 2016 by PM Turnbull, while framed as protecting volunteers, was certainly not free of politics – it was during an election and targeted at winning votes in marginal Victorian seats by highlighting a state Labor government’s missteps. The resultant Fair Work Act amendments became something of a partisan football: State Labor condemned it as Canberra meddling to score points, while federal Coalition hailed it as standing up for volunteers. When federal Labor returned to power in 2022, they actually moved to repeal that section of the Fair Work Act (given the CFA restructure had happened in the meantime, they argued it was no longer needed and was an ideological clause). Such swings further entangle the fire services in politics – legislation affecting them can change depending on who’s in office federally.
• The Fire Services Reform of 2020 was deeply political in both origin and execution. The secretive planning by DPC under Premier Andrews and Deputy Premier Merlino (post-2016) was done within the Premier’s own department, reflecting how politically sensitive the issue was. When initially attempted in 2017, it failed to pass partly because Labor lacked an upper house majority and the issue had become so contentious that key crossbenchers wouldn’t support it. After the 2018 election, with an increased majority, Labor pushed it through, even tying it to the firefighters’ cancer compensation bill to pressure passage. Many volunteers and some commentators criticized this tactic as “holding presumptive legislation hostage” to force the fire service changes – basically using sick firefighters’ compensation (which all agreed on) as leverage to get the contentious reform through[17]. That kind of hardball politics, while ultimately successful legislatively, left a sour taste among some stakeholders. Volunteer advocates said it was an abuse of process, and that a better reform could have been designed with proper consultation rather than political brute force. Indeed, the 2017 Select Committee had recommended withdrawing the bill and going back to consult – advice that was ignored.
• Another aspect is how ministerial leadership has changed. The Emergency Services Minister portfolio saw high turnover at critical times: e.g., Jane Garrett resigning on principle in 2016; her successor James Merlino juggling the issue as Deputy Premier; later ministers like Lisa Neville, and currently Jaclyn Symes, each had to handle the ongoing fallout. At times, fire service leadership found strong support from their minister (Garrett stood by CFA’s stance initially), at others the minister was perceived as siding with the union or being absent. Political leadership from ministers can either bolster or undermine agency leadership. When a minister sacks a board or rebukes a chief publicly, it’s devastating to internal morale. Conversely, when a minister defends the agency’s integrity (as Garrett attempted), it can empower the leadership – though in her case the Premier’s opposing stance overruled it.

Public trust is intertwined with political interference. The public generally holds firefighters in high esteem, but trust in the institutions can erode if they appear to be politically manipulated or if service delivery suffers. In mid-2016, Victorian public confidence in the CFA’s governance likely took a hit seeing such chaos unfold. Anecdotally, volunteers reported community members asking if the CFA would even be operational given all the drama. That’s dangerous territory – trust that when you dial 000, the fire service will respond swiftly and effectively is paramount. Restoring that trust required demonstrating that despite internal conflict, firefighters still had the community’s back (which fortunately they did; both volunteers and staff maintained service through disputes). Political leaders also had to do damage control – e.g., Premier Andrews repeatedly insisted that “community safety won’t be compromised” amid reforms, urging people to see it as a positive change.

The media has played a role in framing trust issues. Investigative reports by newspapers (e.g., The Age’s coverage of the UFU’s influence, or the Herald Sun’s often blunt criticism of the Andrews government’s handling of the CFA) influenced public sentiment. The fire services became a proxy battle in media between those accusing Labor of union cronyism and those accusing conservatives of undermining workers’ rights. Lost in that was nuance about genuine organisational improvement.

Political interference also includes the influence of local MPs and councils sometimes. Many rural MPs champion their volunteer brigades and will raise a hue and cry if, say, a town’s CFA brigade is slated to be downgraded or merged. This can stymie logical reorganisation of resources. Conversely, unions have allies in parliament who may intervene to stop actions against union members or slow changes to conditions.

All this has an insidious effect: leadership (CFA/FRV chiefs and CEOs) might feel they are constantly walking on eggshells politically. Instead of purely focusing on operational excellence, they must gauge how a decision will be viewed by ministers, backbenchers, volunteer lobby groups, etc. If they do nothing, they’re criticized for inaction; if they do something bold, they risk getting cut down by someone it displeases. That environment can lead to a degree of paralysis or ultra-cautious leadership – not healthy for an emergency service that should be dynamic and innovative.

Rebuilding public trust requires de-politicizing the narrative. This might involve bipartisan support for key initiatives (so neither side plays politics with it) and greater transparency to the public about decisions (so they aren’t seen as backroom deals). The public ultimately wants to know that, politics aside, the fire agencies are well-led and will protect them. Grandstanding and crises only shake that confidence.

The events of 2016 in particular likely left some scars in public trust, but by 2020 the government tried to present the reforms as “fixing the CFA”. Some in the public, particularly volunteers and their communities, remained skeptical; others moved on and accepted the new structure. With a few years of relatively quieter operation now, trust can be rebuilt steadily if no new debacles occur.

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Having dissected the key contributing factors to leadership challenges – industrial disputes, union influence, volunteer-career tensions, governance changes, resource constraints, culture problems, and political interference – we now turn to lessons from beyond Victoria’s borders. How have other jurisdictions handled similar issues? What can Victoria learn from them?

International Comparisons and Lessons (Beyond the USA)

While fire service arrangements vary widely around the world, several regions offer instructive parallels to Victoria’s experience. We specifically look at cases in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other Australian states – all excluding the United States, as requested – to glean insights on managing volunteer/career integration, union relations, and organisational change in fire services.

New Zealand: Integration and Its Discontents

In 2017, New Zealand underwent a major fire service reform somewhat analogous to Victoria’s 2020 changes. NZ merged its urban career firefighting force (the New Zealand Fire Service) with the rural volunteer fire authorities into a single unified agency: Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ). This created one national fire service composed of both career and volunteer firefighters (around 14,000 volunteers and 1,800 career staff), replacing a system of separate entities. The goal was to improve coordination and reduce administrative silos. This contrasts with Victoria’s approach of separating volunteers and career – NZ basically did the opposite by bringing them all under one roof.

However, NZ’s integration hasn’t been without friction. The New Zealand Professional Firefighters Union (NZPFU), representing career firefighters, has a strong voice quite like the UFU. Since the merger, the NZPFU has engaged in strikes and industrial action seeking better pay and resources, leading to the country’s first-ever nationwide firefighter strike in 2022 over a contract dispute and what the union called a “crisis” in staffing and equipment[18]. Meanwhile, the United Fire Brigades’ Association (UFBA) represents volunteers and has been vigilant that volunteers don’t get side-lined within FENZ. One issue raised was financial: after an expensive settlement with the union, would FENZ have to divert funds that might otherwise go to volunteer brigades? The UFBA chairman warned “volunteer firefighters must not lose out because of the settlement with employed staff”, noting that volunteers cover 93% of NZ’s land area and 85% of incidents, and their funding and support must be maintained. This mirrors Victorian volunteers’ fear that union gains come at their expense.

Culturally, integrating volunteers and paid staff in NZ has required forging a new united identity. FENZ established a Volunteerism Strategy and a Volunteer Advisory Committee to ensure volunteer voices are heard in the new structure. But early on, some volunteers felt the big centralised organisation was too Wellington (capital)-centric and that their local flexibility was reduced. On the other hand, career staff felt that at last they had one national command and could standardize training and equipment across the country.

A notable lesson from NZ is the importance of funding and communication in reforms. The NZ government significantly increased fire service funding during the merger to address long-neglected equipment issues and to hire more firefighters, which helped alleviate some union grievances. Still, by 2022 the union argued more was needed, hence the strikes. For Victoria, NZ’s experience suggests that even a unified service faces volunteer-vs-union tensions if resources are perceived as zero-sum. Also, change management in NZ showed that constant engagement with volunteers to reassure them of their value in a new system was vital. Victoria’s reform, conversely, essentially carved out volunteer operations to preserve their autonomy, avoiding having to integrate cultures but at the cost of duplication and still needing mechanisms for cooperation.

United Kingdom: Professional Strikes and Modernisation Efforts

The United Kingdom’s fire services are almost entirely wholetime (paid) or retained (paid on-call) firefighters, with very few pure volunteers. So the volunteer-career dynamic is less applicable. However, the UK provides a look at union-government clashes and leadership issues in a fully professional setting. The Fire Brigades Union (FBU) in the UK is a very militant union (like UFU) that has sparred with government over pay, pensions, and staffing for decades. In 2002-2003, the UK experienced a huge nationwide firefighters’ strike – the first since the 1970s – when the FBU struck for better pay (demanding 40% increases) and the government, citing the need for modernization and budget limits, resisted. This led to the deployment of military “Green Goddess” fire engines as contingency. The strike ended with a compromise: significant pay raises but also a commitment to modernize working practices. An independent review known as the Bain Report recommended modernising the fire service, including crew duty changes and diversification of firefighter roles (more fire prevention, community safety work).

Relevance to Victoria: The UK’s saga shows that even without volunteers involved, union disputes can become intractable and politicized, requiring outside intervention (Bain’s review similar in spirit to our Fire Services Review). It underscores how pay and conditions disputes can mask deeper issues of modernization – in Victoria, the union fights have also been about who controls changes to work practices. The UK government had to legislate to enact some reforms, which is comparable to Victorian governments having to legislate changes (like presumptive rights and fire service restructuring) when agreements couldn’t be reached cooperatively.

One difference is that UK fire services are run by local fire authorities (except national standards set by government), so political interference can vary regionally. London’s fire brigade, for instance, has seen commissioners resign after inquiries (such as after the 2017 Grenfell Tower disaster, the commissioner retired amid criticism of preparedness and response – a leadership accountability moment). That scenario resonates with CFA leaders resigning after events like Black Saturday or Fiskville scandal; public inquiries can precipitate leadership change to satisfy public demand for accountability.

The UK also dealt with cultural issues: the FBU resisted some reforms like multi-tier entry (bringing in external recruits to officer roles) and diversifying the workforce. Over time, however, UK services have slowly increased diversity (London Fire Brigade now has around 500 female firefighters, for example, still a small portion but growing). They too have had bullying and harassment issues come to light (the LFB was recently subject to a scathing independent culture review in 2022 finding institutional misogyny and racism). So the culture problems are not unique to Victoria; even a purely professional service with strong union presence can have deep-seated culture issues that leadership struggles to root out.

Lesson: The UK experience suggests the value of independent reviews and reports in breaking deadlocks and driving change (Bain review 2002, culture reviews recently). Victoria similarly has used inquiries – but the key is actually acting on them, not shelving them due to stakeholder pushback.

Other Australian States: Different Models, Similar Pressures

Looking around Australia, each state handles the mix of volunteer and paid firefighting slightly differently, offering natural experiments:

• New South Wales: Has a structure somewhat akin to Victoria’s post-2020 model. NSW has two separate services: the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS), almost entirely volunteer (with a small number of salaried officers mainly in administrative roles), and Fire and Rescue NSW (FRNSW), entirely career firefighters covering cities and towns. This separation, like CFA/FRV, avoids a single organisation conflict. RFS volunteers have their own strong identity and a Volunteer Association, while FRNSW professional firefighters are unionized under the Fire Brigade Employees’ Union (FBEU). Generally, NSW’s arrangement works with clear delineation: RFS handles bushfires and rural areas, FRNSW handles metropolitan fires, and they assist each other as needed (under a statewide emergency management framework). However, even NSW has had moments of tension: the FBEU at times campaigns against RFS initiatives encroaching on towns, and volunteers watch vigilantly that RFS retains autonomy (the NSW government is usually supportive – NSW RFS Commissioner is a powerful position, especially after the heroic perception following events like the 2019-20 fires). A notable difference: the NSW RFS is led by a Commissioner who is a public service head reporting to the Minister, and that Minister (recently) was incidentally the Deputy Premier who was also a volunteer firefighter. This perhaps gave volunteers a direct political champion. Victoria could observe that NSW’s firm separation largely spares it the kind of public civil war seen in Victoria 2016. The trade-off is duplication and sometimes rivalry. On a tragic note, the death of RFS volunteer firefighters in the 2019-20 fires saw the union controversially suggest that better resourcing of paid crews might have avoided some tragedies – comments that sparked anger as disparaging volunteers. This shows underlying frictions can still bubble up.
• Queensland: Until recently, QLD had a unified department (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) that included urban paid firefighters and the Rural Fire Service Queensland (volunteers) as subdivisions. This is more like NZ’s integrated model. However, Queensland encountered issues of volunteers feeling a lack of legal status and support. In 2022, after a review, the QLD government announced a restructure to create a new independent Rural Fire Service within a revamped Queensland Fire Department, separating it somewhat from the city fire service. This was driven by an odd legal case that highlighted uncertainty about volunteer firefighters’ authority. The resolution was to clarify RFS’s chain of command and give it its own budget and identity, distinct from the urban fire service. This is essentially moving closer to the NSW/Victoria model. The lesson here is the grass isn’t always greener: QLD tried an integrated approach but found that volunteers felt under-supported or legally ambiguous, prompting a shift to separation. Victoria should monitor QLD’s transition to see if it improves volunteer satisfaction and effectiveness.
• South Australia and Western Australia: Both have somewhat hybrid systems. SA has the Country Fire Service (CFS) for rural (volunteers) and Metropolitan Fire Service (MFS) for metro (paid), separate organisations under one emergency department. WA has Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFES) overseeing career firefighters and the Bush Fire Service (volunteers are under local government control historically, though there are ongoing debates to bring them under DFES fully). These states haven’t had the level of public industrial drama as Victoria, possibly due to smaller union footprint or different political landscapes. But they have had union vs volunteer spats – e.g., in WA, the United Firefighters Union (WA branch) has occasionally been at odds with the Bush Fire Volunteers association, particularly after devastating fires where inquiries recommended more unified command (volunteers fear being taken over). WA’s government in 2017 proposed a rural fire service which volunteers wanted independent, but it ended up not fully separate, partly due to cost issues and union concerns. The pattern is familiar: volunteer groups push for autonomy, unions push for expansion of career roles, governments try to balance both.

Common threads internationally: It appears that managing the volunteer-career mix is a universal challenge – integrate them and you risk volunteers feeling subordinated, separate them and you risk inefficiencies or competition. Union influence is potent wherever strong firefighter unions exist (NZ, UK, parts of Australia). Political and community contexts vary, but a lesson is that transparent, consultative reform tends to fare better than unilateral decisions. Countries like NZ undertook extensive consultation for their reforms (though not all volunteers agree with the outcome, the process was inclusive). In Victoria’s case, consultation in 2020 was limited (owing perhaps to battle fatigue after 2017’s failed attempt), which has left lingering resentment.

Another lesson is the need for robust volunteer support systems. NZ created the UFBA support role in FENZ, NSW’s RFS has a Volunteer Relations branch and formal volunteer representation in decisions, QLD is boosting RFS identity. Victoria should ensure CFA volunteers have real input into strategy – which could be through the CFA Board (it now has several volunteer representatives) and consultative committees.

From the UK, a more union-centric system, we see that even absent volunteers, leadership can be rocked by union-government clashes (pay strikes) or major incident failures (Grenfell). Key takeaways include the importance of investing in modernisation to address union grievances and the value of independent oversight (e.g., Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services now regularly reviews UK fire services to ensure accountability – something like Victoria’s Inspector-General for Emergency Management plays a role in auditing performance here).

In conclusion, international and interstate comparisons show there is no perfect model – each has trade-offs. However, they provide hope and ideas: It is possible to have functioning systems where volunteers and paid staff coexist (NSW), or where one integrated service functions (NZ, though still improving), or where robust reforms come after hard lessons (UK modernising after strikes). The overarching lesson is that clear roles, mutual respect, strong leadership and adequate resources are universal ingredients for success.

Victoria can learn from these by, for instance, adopting best practices for volunteer inclusion from NSW, avoiding pitfalls NZ encountered by ring-fencing volunteer funding, and reinforcing a culture of continuous improvement and external audit like the UK to maintain public trust.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Over 35 years, Victoria’s fire services have weathered tumultuous leadership storms. We have seen how industrial strife, union-management power struggles, volunteer-career divisions, structural shake-ups, resource crunches, cultural failings, and political maneuvering all contributed to an era of instability for the CFA and, more recently, FRV. The cost has been high – measured in lost leaders, organisational upheaval, damaged morale, and public controversy. Yet, the dedication of firefighters (volunteer and career alike) never wavered when it came to protecting the community. That is the solid foundation upon which any reform must build: the shared commitment to the mission.

Going forward, a more stable, cohesive and effective fire service in Victoria is possible. It will require willpower and collaboration from all sides – government, fire service leadership, the UFU, volunteer associations, and indeed the firefighters themselves. Based on the analysis above, here are evidence-based recommendations to improve leadership, governance and cohesion in Victoria’s fire services:

1. Rebalance Governance and Accountability: The governance model should be adjusted to ensure both CFA and FRV can manage their responsibilities effectively while cooperating seamlessly. This means revisiting the secondment system. Consider enabling the CFA to directly employ a sufficient number of its own operational support officers (even if on contracts or through a different industrial arrangement) to reduce total reliance on FRV. The Fire Services Implementation Monitor’s reports have made clear that the secondment model, as is, has “constrained CFA’s ability to effectively manage” its people and left key positions vacant【24continued (from above):

• Rebalance Governance and Accountability: The current secondment arrangement should be overhauled. It has given FRV disproportionate control over CFA’s operations and created blurred accountability. The CFA Chief Officer must regain full command of his operational workforce – for example, by allowing CFA to directly hire critical operational staff or by mandating FRV to fill seconded vacancies promptly with CFA input. Clear performance agreements between CFA and FRV should set service standards, and any cost savings from unfilled FRV positions should be redirected to support CFA volunteers (e.g. replacing aging CFA trucks). Strengthen the CFA Board’s volunteer representation and reinstate a culture of consultation and agreement between agencies, not just with the union. A formal joint CFA-FRV coordination committee (with independent oversight) could help resolve inter-agency issues in real time, instead of letting them fester. Finally, establish fixed-term appointments for the FRV Commissioner and CFA Chief Officer, with bi-partisan confirmation, to shield these leadership roles from political churn.
• Repair the Volunteer–Career Relationship: Deliberate efforts are needed to heal the rift between volunteers and paid firefighters. The CFA and FRV should implement regular joint training, exercises, and team-building programs that bring volunteers and career staff together in non-emergency settings to foster mutual respect. Reinforce the message that they are part of one team protecting Victoria, just in different capacities. The state should also enhance the Volunteer Charter in legislation – for instance, giving VFBV (and VVFA) a guaranteed seat at the table in any future fire service reviews or EBA negotiations that could affect volunteers. This doesn’t mean volunteers veto EBAs, but their perspectives on operational impact must be formally considered. A well-resourced volunteer support program (covering training, mental health, and expense reimbursement) should be funded to address volunteer concerns and improve retention, so volunteers feel valued by leadership in deeds, not just words[6]. Additionally, open pathways for volunteers to join FRV if they meet requirements – perhaps a certain intake percentage reserved for qualified CFA volunteers – to remove the perception of a closed shop[5]. These measures will improve morale and trust, empowering leaders to lead a more cohesive workforce.
• Enhance Industrial Relations Frameworks: The enterprise bargaining process needs reform so it doesn’t again reach the destructive stalemate of 2016. Future EBAs should be negotiated with greater transparency and independent mediation. The state government can utilize the Fair Work Commission’s interest-based bargaining methods or appoint an independent facilitator early in talks to bridge UFU and management differences before they harden. Importantly, implement IBAC’s recommendation for standardized, fair consultation clauses in agreements – clauses that require genuine consultation with the union on changes but don’t hand veto power that can paralyze management. The UFU, for its part, should be encouraged to be part of solutions (for example, collaborating on productivity improvements that free up funds for firefighter safety initiatives). Including a clause in the EBA that explicitly acknowledges the roles of volunteers and the CFA’s obligations under the Volunteer Charter could also prevent future agreements from being interpreted as eroding volunteer rights. By depoliticizing EBA content (perhaps prohibiting clauses that stray beyond employment matters), the focus can return to fair pay and safe conditions – which is what the public expects the debate to be about.
• Invest in Leadership and Culture Change: Both CFA and FRV must continue to drive cultural reform. This starts with leadership development – ensuring that those elevated to management (whether volunteer captains or career station officers and above) are trained in people-management, diversity and conflict resolution. Zero tolerance policies for bullying, discrimination and harassment need teeth: independent avenues to report misconduct (such as the Speak Safe service FENZ uses, or Victoria’s own VEOHRC oversight) and prompt disciplinary follow-through, even if the union or old networks apply pressure to bury it. The union should be engaged as a partner in culture change – for instance, UFU delegates could be trained as positive culture ambassadors, not just industrial reps. The suppressed VEOHRC report should be revisited; even if not released publicly, CFA and FRV leadership together with the UFU and volunteer reps should review its findings in camera and commit to an action plan on gender and inclusion. A clear sign of change would be to publish annual metrics on workforce diversity and misconduct complaints resolved, to rebuild trust through transparency. As Monash researchers noted, shining a light on the “boys’ club” culture is uncomfortable but necessary. Over time, a healthier internal culture will underpin more stable leadership (leaders won’t be constantly firefighting internal issues, so to speak).
• Secure Sustainable Funding and Resources: The state government must ensure that both CFA and FRV have the resources to meet increasing service demands and implement these reforms. This includes funding for modern fleet and equipment updates (with priority to CFA volunteers who rely on government for gear), enough career firefighters to cover growing urban areas (so staffing clauses aren’t a battle every EBA), and support staff to take administrative burdens off volunteers. A strong case, backed by data, should be made in government budget processes that investing in fire services saves lives and property – preventative and response capabilities alike. Inquiries from Fiskville to Royal Commissions have shown that under-investment can lead to greater costs (whether in disasters or health consequences) down the line. Moreover, if volunteers see improvements like new trucks, stations, and training facilities flowing to their communities, they will feel “heard” by leadership, easing long-running resentments. The Fire Services Implementation Monitor recommended publicly reporting FRV’s secondment vacancies and using any savings for CFA equipment; implementing such measures ensures money allocated for fire services stays in fire services. At the end of the day, adequate resourcing is the fuel that enables good leadership to drive change.
• Depoliticize the Fire Services: Finally, all political actors should commit to keeping frontline fire services out of partisan politics as much as possible. This means respecting the expertise of fire service leadership and boards, and not using the CFA/FRV as a political football in election campaigns (as tempting as that might be for short-term gain). The 2016 saga showed how damaging it is when the CFA is mired in political controversy – public trust took a hit and volunteers felt like political pawns. A cross-party parliamentary committee or advisory panel on emergency services could be established to build bipartisan support for key reforms (for instance, both sides agreeing on the need to fix secondments or to fund certain capabilities). Federally, refrain from future one-size-fits-all interventions (like the 2016 Fair Work Act amendment) without thorough consultation, as these can inflame state relations. Instead, support Victoria through funding (such as disaster resilience grants) and let Victorian stakeholders drive solutions tailored to their context. In short, let CFA and FRV be led by fire service professionals in partnership with their members and communities – not by political expediency. Re-earning public trust requires demonstrating that decisions about fire services put community safety first, not any party or interest group.

Implementing these recommendations will not be easy – it requires goodwill, dialogue and sometimes swallowing of pride by various parties. But the reward is great: a fire service system where volunteer brigades and career stations each flourish and work together, where frontline firefighters feel supported by their leaders (and vice versa), and where political leaders take pride in a resilient, low-drama emergency service that Victorians trust with their lives. The CFA and FRV can then focus squarely on their shared mission: protecting Victorians from fire and other emergencies, together.

Victoria’s fire services have a rich history of bravery, dedication and community spirit. By learning from past turbulence and embracing reform, they can forge a future in which strong, stable leadership is the norm. The journey from 1990 to 2025 has been rough, but it has also provided a map of pitfalls to avoid and paths to a stronger, safer Victoria. As one former CFA Chief succinctly put it, “we’re all here for the same reason – to keep Victorians safe.” Re-focusing on that common purpose, with reformed structures to support it, will ensure the men and women of both CFA and FRV can do what they do best, with unity of command and effort, long into the future.

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Footnotes

1. Country Fire Authority (CFA) Annual Report 1999–2000, noting protracted EBA negotiations with the United Firefighters Union and the CFA’s refusal to agree to claims that would diminish volunteer rights.
2. CFA Annual Report 1999–2000, detailing the UFU’s work bans during the 1999–2000 fire season and the eventual agreement to remove the Community Support Facilitator roles, which caused discontent among brigades.
3. CFA Annual Report 1999–2000, Chairman’s overview, acknowledging the difficulty of EBA negotiations throughout 1999 due to the CFA’s unique mix of career and volunteer firefighters.
4. Fire Rescue Victoria – Wikipedia (History section), noting that the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission recommended appointing a Fire Commissioner to advise on CFA/MFB boundaries.
5. Volunteer Fire Brigades Victoria (VFBV) briefing “CFA union deal a setback for volunteering” (9 Sept 2010), outlining how the 2010 CFA-UFU EBA restricted volunteer training, voice, and career opportunities.
6. VFBV, “Jones Inquiry (2011) – Independent Inquiry into the effect of arrangements on CFA Volunteers,” summary of findings calling for better volunteer training access, consultation, and support (VFBV website).
7. Herald Sun, “Ex-judge forewarned against veto powers” (28 Feb 2008), reporting that Judge Gordon Lewis warned the government in 2008 not to grant UFU broad “consult and agree” veto powers in the MFB – a warning not heeded, leading to later problems.
8. The Guardian, “Victoria’s chief fire officer resigns over industrial agreement with union” (Calla Wahlquist, 29 June 2016), recounting CFA Chief Officer Joe Buffone’s resignation in protest at the UFU deal and noting it “claimed the entire leadership” of the CFA (Minister, CEO, CO, Board all gone).
9. ABC News, “Malcolm Turnbull vows to amend the Fair Work Act; backs volunteer firefighters during Melbourne protest” (5 June 2016), describing the PM’s speech to hundreds of CFA volunteers at a rally and his quote that the EBA was “an extraordinary assault” on volunteerism.
10. The Guardian, “Malcolm Turnbull’s CFA volunteers bill passes Senate with help of crossbench” (Paul Karp, 2016) – noting the passage of the Fair Work Amendment (Respect for Emergency Services Volunteers) Act 2016 and Turnbull’s claim it would prevent enterprise agreements from undermining volunteer organisations.
11. The Age, “Firefighters’ dispute explained” (Josh Gordon, 2016) – explaining how the Victorian Labor government’s handling of the CFA dispute hurt it in rural electorates and became a federal election issue (Corangamite, etc.), per RMIT’s David Hayward.
12. Parliament of Victoria, Select Committee on Fire Services Bill – Final Report (18 Aug 2017), media release summary stating nearly 1,900 submissions were received and public hearings held statewide, and recommending the 2017 reform bill not proceed.
13. VFBV summary of the Select Committee Final Report (2017), highlighting that the committee uncovered the reform’s secondment model was devised in secret and recommended withdrawing the legislation.
14. Fire Rescue Victoria – Wikipedia, noting that the primary driver for the CFA/FRV split was to resolve the industrial dispute arising from the CFA-UFU EBA negotiations.
15. IBAC Special Report 2024 – Operation Turton (Victorian Parliament Tabled Paper), Commissioner’s foreword concluding that while union representation is a right, IBAC found the UFU’s influence over day-to-day operations “often hindered the effective administration” of the MFB/FRV.
16. Herald Sun, “Fire union boss scoffs at ‘thuggery’ allegations” (2015) and other media reports – detailing allegations of UFU Secretary Peter Marshall bullying MFB Chief Officer Peter Rau, which Marshall denied (Herald Sun 20 Jan 2015). (Also see ABC Radio, PM, “Peter Marshall on the CFA dispute”, 2016).
17. ABC News, “Presumptive rights Bill tied to fire services reform” (Richard Willingham, 2017) – reporting on criticism that cancer compensation for firefighters was being linked to passing the CFA/FRV reform, seen by volunteers and opposition as political leverage.
18. RNZ News (New Zealand), “Firefighters’ strikes put the public at risk – bosses” and “Agreement for professional firefighters must not affect funding for volunteers – union” (Oct 2022), covering NZ PFU strikes and quotes from UFBA’s Peter Dunne that 85% of NZ’s fire brigades are volunteer and their funding must not suffer due to the union deal.
19. The Independent Culture Review of London Fire Brigade (2022) – an example from the UK where an external review found institutional misogyny, racism and bullying in a fire service, leading to calls for major culture change (BBC News, 28 Nov 2022, “London fire brigade institutionally misogynist and racist”). Illustrative for cultural issues similar to those identified in CFA/MFB by VEOHRC (2018).
20. Fire Services Implementation Monitor – Year 4 Report (2023) and VFBV Statement (5 Dec 2024), highlighting that after four years, the Monitor (ex-Judge Gordon Lewis) still found the secondment and “consult and agree” arrangements unworkable, echoing issues first raised in his 2008 report. VFBV calls for restoring CFA Chief Officer’s control over his staff and publicly reporting FRV vacancies.

Author’s Note:

This paper was developed with the assistance of ChatGPT, an advanced artificial intelligence language model created by OpenAI. The AI was used to support research, structure content, clarify complex topics, and enhance readability. While AI played a key role in drafting and refining the article, all information has been carefully reviewed, fact-checked, and edited by the author, Ken Ashford, to ensure accuracy, relevance, and balance. The views expressed are those of the author and reflect a combination of AI-generated insights and human expertise. This collaborative approach was used to improve both the depth and accessibility of the final content.